LIBOR

Stressed Interest Rates: Battle of the Models

For generating shocked interest rate curves, such as a sudden economic stress might engender, “a three-factor parameterization solves many problems—but issues remain,” said Alexander Bogin, Senior Economist at the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and the second presenter at a webinar on modelling interest rate shocks held October 28, 2014, and sponsored by the Global Association of Risk Professionals. To develop an improved yield curve approximation, Bogin showed three variants of non-linear Laguerre functions of time to maturity.  These were the Nelson-Siegel model (which has 3 factors); the Svensson model (4 factors); and the Björk-Christensen model (5 factors). Over a two-year […]

Stressed Interest Rates: ‘Simple’ Not Good Enough

“It’s difficult to apply historical down-shocks to the current low interest rate environment,” said Will Doerner, “and models have problems in the low interest rate environments of today.” Doerner is Senior Economist at the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“Agency”), and was the first presenter at a GARP webinar on how to generate historically-based interest rate shocks, which was held October 28, 2014. An accurate estimation of market risk helps financial institutions determine the amount of capital needed to withstand adverse market events. Interest rate changes represent a key factor for institutions with large fixed income portfolios. As such, when stress […]

Libor Fallout: Part 3. A Muted Valuation Effect

On December 20, 2012, the third presenter at the GARP webinar on the LIBOR scandal was Robert Maxim, director of Complex Asset Solutions at Duff & Phelps. He spoke about the valuation implications of incorrect LIBOR rates. The cash flow of many financial instruments is indexed to LIBOR, he said, for big companies as well as small, and even for individual consumers such as those holding private student loans. Maxim considered an interest rate swap example in which the floating leg is tied to LIBOR. The valuation is always computed on the difference between the fixed and floating leg. “The […]

Libor Fallout: Part 2. Whistling Past the Graveyard

On December 20, 2012, the second presenter at the GARP webinar on the LIBOR scandal was Cliff Rossi, Executive-in-Residence, Center for Financial Policy, University of Maryland.  He described the risk implications arising from the Wheatley Review of LIBOR. Rossi noted that some market participants were “still feeling PTSD from the financial crisis of 2008”—and then they got hit with the LIBOR scandal.  Rossi succinctly described what went wrong:  Low volume in interbank lending in unsecured transactions created an over-reliance on “expert judgement” hence the rate was subject to manipulation. Part of the problem, Rossi said, is that LIBOR reporting was […]

Libor Fallout: Part 1. The Stomach Ache During the Heart Attack

The emerging scandal around the setting of LIBOR (the London Interbank Offered Rate) prompted GARP (the Global Association of Risk Professionals) to convene a panel of three experts to inform its members about the background and implications of the LIBOR fraud. On December 20, 2012, the first presenter at the GARP webinar was Amy Poster, Strategic Adviser at Iron Harbor Capital Management. She described the background and key facts. Calling it the “$800 trillion scandal,” Poster said that these events touched many derivatives markets, various consumer debt instruments such as credit card loans, and 100 percent of the sub-prime market. […]